State of Utah, In The Interest of Evan Orgill And Bart Orgill, Persons Under 18 Years of Age v. Joyce Thomason : Respondent\u27s Brief On Appeal by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1977
State of Utah, In The Interest of Evan Orgill And
Bart Orgill, Persons Under 18 Years of Age v. Joyce
Thomason : Respondent's Brief On Appeal
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.David S. Dolowitz; Attorney for AppellantRobert B. Hansen,
Olof Johansson, David Little field; Attorneys for Respondent
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Utah v. Thomason, No. 15140 (Utah Supreme Court, 1977).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/610
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH, in the 
interest of Evan Orgill and 
Bart Orgill, persons under 
18 years of age, 
vs. 
JOYCE THOMASON, 
Appellant. 
Case No. 15140 
* * * * * * * 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
* * * * * * * 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
FRANKLYN B. MATHESON 
Assistant Attorney General 
OLOF JOHANSSON 
Deputy County Attorney 
Salt Lake County 
Attorneys for Respondent 
DAVID E. LITTLEFIELD 
Guardian Ad Li tern for 
Evan Orgill and Bart Orgill 
CON BLACKHAM 
Attorney for Appellant 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Evan & Bart 
Orgill 
79 South State Street 
P. o. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: 532-1234 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
::.o.TUKE CJF THE CASE 
:JISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
::.;TURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS • . 
.:..RGUMENT 
THE JUVENILE COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
THE APPELLANT SHOULD BE TERMINATED FROM HER 
1 
1 
2 
2 
PARENTAL INTERESTS IN EVAN AND BART ORGILL. • 9 
POINT I 
THE CONDUCT OF THE APPELLANT AND HER 
EMOTIONAL CONDITION HAS PRODUCED A SITU-
ATION WHICH IS SERIOUSLY DETRIMENTAL TO 
HER CHILDREN AND IT REQUIRES THE TERMIN-
ATION OF ALL OF HER PARENTAL INTERESTS 
IN THEM. • • • • . . • • • • • • • • 10 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT ABANDONED HER CHILDREN 14 
CONCLUSION . • . • . • • • . • 17 
CITATIONS 
State v. Dade, 14 Utah 2d 47, 376 P. 2d 948 (1962) ••• 9,10,14 
State in the Interest of Ricky Winger, 558 P. 2d 1311 
(1976) . . • • • . • • • • • • • • 12 
State in the Interest of Summers Children v. 
Wulffenstein, 560 P. 2d 331 (Utah, 1977). 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
155-10-109, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
)78-3a-48, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 • 
14,15,17 
1 
1,10,16,17 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
'TATE OF UTAH, in the 
~nterest of Evan Orgill and 
3art Orgill, persons under 
13 years of age, RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
ON APPEAL 
vs. 
JOYCE THOMASON I Case No. 15140 
Appellant. 
* * * * * * * 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is the appeal of an Order entered on March 22, 
1977 by the Second District Juvenile Court, the Honorable John 
Farr Larson presiding, permanently terminating the parental 
rights of Joyce Thomason, the natural mother of Evan Orgill and 
Bart Orgill in those boys pursuant to the provisions of Section 
l 
55-10-109, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, now Section 78-3a-48, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After trial, the Juvenile Court determined that the 
parental rights of the appellant, Joyce Thomason, natural mother 
~f Evan and Bart Orgill and their father, Leonard Orgill, 1 
snould be terminated on the grounds that their conduct created a 
:ondition seriously detrimental to Evan and Bart, the abandonment 
1. The natural father of Evan and Bart Orgill has not 
l?Pealed this decision. 
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of the children by appellant, and the emotional condition . Ot : 
appellant and the emotional condition of the children createc 
situation seriously detrimental to the children. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks to have the decision of the Ju·:e:. 
Court reversed and the children returned to their natural mot:., 
This respondent, counsel for the children employed by the fos:: 
parents, seeks affirmation of the decision of the Juvenile Co;: 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This respondent does not believe that the appellant:. 
stated the complete facts in this matter and presents the fol'.:. 
ing Statement of Facts: 
Evan and Bart Orgill were born of the marriages of 
Leonard and Joyce Orgill (Record, 155), who were married twice 1 
and divorced twice. (Record, 222.) On July 6, 1973, after tr.e 
second divorce, Joyce Orgill married Kenneth Thomason (Record, 
155) and the appellant, Kenneth Thomason, and the five childr:: 
resided together as a family living on public assistance from 
July of 1973 through February of 1974. (Record, 147, 156-57.1 
Because of the drinking of Kenneth Thomason, financ;;. 
pressures, her emotional inability to cope with the situation, 
and the desire to get the children into a stable environment, 
appellant placed all five of her children with the Division o'. 
Family Services for foster care in February of 197 4. (Record, 
138-139, 140, 156, 157, 158, 164, 165, 210-11.) Evan and Bart 
-2-
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,ere placed in one foster home and the other three children were 
?laced ,in other foster homes. (Record, 151, 173-74.) Visitation 
·.Hth all of the children after they were placed in foster care 
,as arranged first through Christine Calver (from February through 
2 September of 19 7 4) and thereafter through Linnaea Bowles , the 
foster care workers assigned to the case by the Division of 
Family Services. (Record, 159, 161, 173, 174.) 
After Evan and Bart were placed in foster care, appel-
lant visited with them only twice. (Record, 63, 160.) The first 
visit, on March 12, 1974, was a disaster. Mr. Thomason was 
drinking and became intoxicated. He cornered Ms. Calver for a 
half hour and berated her about his desire not to have the child-
ren around when he had been drinking. (Record, 63-64.) He said 
1 1 
he was in pain and wanted to lie down in the middle of Main 
Street and be hit by a car. (Record, 63.) The children witnessed 
this scene while the appellant just sat on a couch and watched. 
(Record, 64.) The second visit took place at the Division of 
Family Services Office just before Mrs. Thomason left for Denver. 
(Record, 160.) 
In July of 1974, appellant moved to Denver (Record, 
160) to improve her economic circumstances. (Record, 166.) She 
lade this move without making any arrangements or plans to con-
. 2. Linnaea Work was married in 1976. She is referred to as 
•
1nnaea Work (her maiden name) in some of the exhibits and testi-
~ony. She will be referred to as Linnaea Bowles throughout this 
Brief, 
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tinue her relationship with her children or rehabilitate ~r~ 
to secure their return. (Record, 166-74.) She made no atte~;· 
to contact Evan and Bart after her arrival in Denver, beli~~ 
that it was best that they be left alone to get settled i~o: 
foster home. (Record, 160, 161.) She did write to Evan and:, 
once, on September 17, 1974. (Record, 266-267.) 
Appellant has not written to Evan or Bart, sent th~ 
Christmas cards, birthday cards or spoken with them again fro: 
September 17, 1974 to the present. (Record, 160-161, 170.) ; 
did request a visit with Evan and Bart when she came into Uta:. • 
December of 1974, but that request was turned down with the 
explanation that she should remain in town and settle herself 
before re-opening contact with Evan and Bart since, the case· 
worker believed, such contact would be disturbing to Evan and 
Bart (Record, 85-86) and appellant should be ready to follow 
through after the initial contact with the restructuring of he: 
relationship with the boys. The social worker testified she f: 
the re-establishment of a relationship should be worked out f::': I 
with the older children as the appellant had maintained contac: I 
I 
with them before recontacting Evan and Bart. (Record, 85-87.1 
Instead of doing so the appellant returned to Denver. (Record. 
87.) 
After the appellant had an opportunity to think over 
what she had been informed by the case worker and how she hac 
responded to that information in December of 197 4, she wrote t:, 
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caseworker an apology and declared that she understood why she 
~ad been denied visitation with Evan and Bart. (Record, 268.) 
!he appellant did not say what she would do to establish that 
relationship before re-opening contact with those children. 
(bcord, 268.) In fact, after moving to Denver in July of 1974, 
the appellant took no action of any kind to establish or implement 
any kind of plan to secure the return to her of Evan and Bart. 
(Record, 166-74.) 
Christine Calver, the social service worker who was 
working with the children wrote to the appellant on September 6, 
1974, that if she did not do something to remain in contact and 
re-establish a relationship with her children the Division of 
Family Services would be forced to take action to implement a 
permanent deprivation of her parental rights in the children. 
(Record, 243.) Ms. Calver also advised the appellant to stop 
making promises to her children which appellant would then break: 
that is, promising to come to Salt Lake City to get them or to 
., stay with them while failing to do so. (Record, 243.) 3 Appellant 
···1 
:: I was advised to contact Dave Christensen to establish a plan for 
J, 
the return of her children. (Record, 243.) The appellant respon-
ded by letter to Mr. Christensen on October 17, 19 7 4, asking what 
She had to do to get the children back. (Record, 262-263.) Mr. 
3. Appellant, in her letter to Evan and Bart of September 17
• 1974, told them that she would return to Salt Lake City, 
t:, :eunite the family and never leave again as soon as she could 
•Hse the money to do so. (Record, 226.) She never did so. 
-5-
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Christensen responded to her on November 18, 1974, that if she 
was not going to return to Salt Lake City she should have ~e 
local welfare department do a home study and evaluation; to"' 
a determination herself as to whether she really wanted the 
children to live with the step-father; to determine if she co::.i 
adequately supervise the children and to obtain an adequate he:-
(Record, 254.) 
Appellant's response, on December 7, 1974, was to 
advise the social service worker, Linnaea Bowles, that she wou:: 
be returning to Salt Lake City on December 14 or 15, 1974, anc 
would contact the Division of Family Services. She stated it 
would be her intention to get a job, establish a home and get~ 
children out of foster care. (Record, 85-86, 253.) Appellant I 
did return to Utah in December of 1974, did visit with the old1: 
I 
three children, but instead of staying in Utah to re-establish,, 
relationship with the children, returned to Denver. 
I 
(Record, : ; 
87.) I 
r , 
When appellant returned to Denver, she did have an 
evaluation made of her home. It indicated that her home was 
adequate and for the return of the children. (Record, 89.) 
Linnaea Bowles felt that the study was not accurate because the 
information she received from Josalyn, oldest 
appellant, who had visited with the appellant 
that Kenneth Thomason had not ceased his drinking and the marr> 
was not stable and could break up at any time. (Record, 89, i:: i J; 
I 
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113 , 116-117.) The evaluation of Mrs. Bowles was that while the 
appellant had moved into a home that was sufficient to accomodate 
the children (Record, 268), appellant had done nothing about 
determining the answers to the other questions, re-establishing a 
relationship with her children or honestly facing up to the 
problems which she had to face if she was to function as the 
mother of her children. (Record, 89.} 
From the transmittal of the letter of February 18, 1975 
to July 28, 1975, there was no contact by the appellant with the 
children or with the Division of Family Services. (Record, 90.} 
on July 28, 1975, the appellant suddenly appeared in Salt Lake 
City (Record, 90) , informed Linnaea Bowles that she was going to 
obtain a job, stay in Utah, re-establish relationships with her 
:I children and divorce Kenneth Thomason. (Record, 90-91.) However, 
I on August 5, without contacting Linnaea Bowles, she left Salt 
., 
I Lake City and returned to Kenneth Thomason. (Record, 91.) 
During this entire visit she did not request a visit with Evan 
and Bart. (Record, 90-91.) 
Thereafter, there was no contact between the appellant 
and the Division of Family Services until February 9, 1976 when 
Linnaea Bowles wrote the appellant to inquire as to whether or 
~ot she had any desire to maintain contact with the children and 
Still wanted them back. (Record, 91-92, 270.) The appellant and 
:::; her husband responded that she had always the children back and 
l~: to contact their attorney to discuss the matter further. 
12-94, 269.) 
-7-
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The result of the failure of appellant to maintain 
contact with Evan and Bart, she admits, has resulted in the 
destruction of the parent-child relationship; there is no ~~­
ingful relationship in existence between herself and her sons, 
Evan and Bart. (Record, 167.) 
Bart Orgill, the younger of the two children, has 
emotionally determined that his parents are dead and that the 
foster parents are his true parents. (Record, 15, 54, 251.) 
Evan has established very close emotional ties with his foster 
father (Record, 246), wants to stay with the foster parents anc 
will, in the opinion of the examining psychologists, establish 
close emotional ties with his foster mother once he knows that 
the ambiguity of the situation is removed. (Record, 26-31, 41· 
42, 251.) Evan, who does recall life with the appellant, wants 
to stay with the foster parents (Record, 7, 11, 29-30, 41, 251\ 
and views separation from the foster parents as abandonment. 
(Record, 44.) The fear Evan has about this situation is that::: 
I 
will be taken from his home which will destroy his structuu 
again. (Record, 26-31, 40-44, 60, 248, 251.) In the opinion c: 
both of the examining psychologists, Evan's ambiguity of feeli.::; 
regarding women and emotional instability is a result of his 
experiences with the appellant. (Record, 30-32, 42, 45-46, 24:-
46, 251.) Both boys would be highly traumatized if taken fret 
the foster home where they have a deep emotional investment ar.c 
have established a psychological parent-child relationship wi::. 
their foster parents. (Record, 26-31, 40-44, 60, 248, 251.) 
-8-
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The appellant's emotional condition is highly unstable. 
The psychological evaluation of the appellant performed by Gordon 
G. Wilson, Ph.D., lead him to diagnose her emotional state as 
being incapable of caring for someone with the special problems 
she has caused in Evan and to cope with the problems of removal 
from the foster home would cause both boys. The appellant married 
two men who she knew were alcoholics. (Record, 222.) She has a 
very limited range of emotional expression (Record, 223), is 
slow, indecisive, uncertain, (Record, 223) with a limited I .Q. 
(Record, 226). She denies that there is any problem on her part 
which requires treatment, even though she has suffered halucina-
tions, dillusions, has heard voices (Record, 224-25), and is a 
border-line psychotic who the examiner felt was a latent schizo-
phrenic. (Record, 226.) She suffers from a lack of integrity in 
her thinking which is the result of her emotional distress. 
(Record, 226.) 
ARGUMENT 
THE JUVENILE COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
THE APPELLANT SHOULD BE TERMINATED FROM HER 
PARENTAL INTERESTS IN EVAN AND BART ORGILL 
This Court has very carefully articulated the competing 
interests that must be considered in a case of the termination of 
.. parental rights pursuant to the Juvenile Court Code. State v. 
L 
~, 14 Utah 2d 47, 376 P.2d 948 (1962). These are the parents, 
37 6 P.2d at 949; the children, 376 P. 2d at 949-50; and the public, 
37 6 P · 2d at 9 50. This Court articulated the over-riding policy 
:;, this type of cases as: 
-9-
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Inasmuch as the public must bear these 
burdens, [homes which produce maladjusted, 
deficient individuals] its functioning 
authorities are not required to always fore-
bear in deference to the desires of persons 
incapable or unwilling to accept their own 
responsibilities. There is a point at which 
it is no longer consistent with the best in-
terests of all concerned merely to continue 
picking up the wounded; and it becomes neces-
sary to perform some social surgery to pre-
vent a continuation of the evils that are 
producing the social harm. Doing so can, in 
the ultimate, best conserve human values and 
provide at least the hope of interrupting the 
self-perpetuating cycle of afflictions that 
fall upon the children and indirectly upon 
the public. Accordingly, the legislature has 
recognized that in cases where there is de-
linquency, dependency or neglect, deprivation 
of the parents of custody of the children is 
justified. (footnote omitted) We agree that 
this is a drastic remedy which should be re-
sorted to only in extreme cases and when it 
is manifest that the home itself cannot or 
will not correct the evils which exist. 376 
P.2d at 950. 
In the instant case, the appellant has, through her own conduct 
both created a condition which is seriously detrimental to her 
children and abandoned them. In addition, her emotinal condit:: 
when seen against the needs of her children reveals a situatio:. 
seriously detrimental to the children. In these circumstances, 
the Trial Court has correctly determined that the appropriate 
response pursuant to Section 78-3a-48, Utah Code Annotated, is 
the termination of all parental rights of the appellant. 
Point I 
THE CONDUCT OF THE APPELLANT AND HER EMO-
TIONAL CONDITION HAS PRODUCED A SITUATION 
WHICH IS SERIOUSLY DETRIMENTAL TO HER 
CHILDREN AND IT REQUIRES THE TERMINATION 
OF ALL OF HER PARENTAL INTERESTS IN THEM. 
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The appellant in the instant case voluntarily placed 
~er children in foster care in February of 197 4. Thereafter, she 
·:isited them twice--in March and May of 1974, wrote to them once, 
on September 9, 1974, and has had no contact with either of them 
since that date. Her husband, their step-father, has had only 
one visit with them since February of 19 7 4. That was in March of 
1975, during which visit he either became or was highly intoxi-
cated. His step-son Evan is afraid of him and wants nothing to 
do with him. (Record, 118.) 
After Evan and Bart were placed in foster care, the 
appellant and her husband stated that they could not take them 
back because they had signed a contract to manage the Alta Motel 
in Salt Lake City for a year and the facilities there were not 
adequate to take care of the children. (Record, 62.) Despite 
this contract, appellant in July of 1974, moved with her husband 
to Denver, making no arrangements to take or to maintain contact 
with the children. In fact, after the move, appellant failed to 
contact anyone at the Division of Family Services about the 
children until Christine Calver, wrote to them in October of 1974 
~d told the appellant that she would be permanently deprived of 
her parental interests in all of the children if she did not take 
some action. (Record, 64-65, 243.) The appellant responded to 
letters from case workers from the Division of Family Services 
and visited Salt Lake City a couple of times thereafter, but 
'.ailed to undertake any action to re-establish a relationship 
-11-
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with Evan and Bart. This is in clear contrast with her cauf~ 
maintenance of contact with the older three children. (Recor: 
86, 90-91, 112-13, 116-17, 170.) 
As a result of these actions, Evan's and Bart's M~. 
bonds to her as their biological mother have ceased to exist. 
She has become dead in the eyes of her youngest child, Bart,.,. 
views his foster parents as his psychological parents. The 
possibility of his return to the appellant serves only to blo:-
the risking of bonding by Evan with his foster mother. These 
acts of the appellant have created a situation seriously detr:-
mental to her children. They need a stable fixed home that wL 
be permanent. The appellant's failure to supply this home as 
produced this sitation and her acts have destroyed her emotion' 
ties to her children. This situation arose as a direct resul: 
the deliberate choices and conduct by the appellant. It is i: 
contrast to the situation presented to this Court in State of 
Utah in the Interest of Ricky Winger, 558 P.2d 1311 (1976), wh::; 
the detrimental situation arose without fault on the part of 
Ricky's mother. 
However, this is not the sole evidence of a seriousi: ' 
detrimental condition affecting Evan and Bart. She is a borde:· 
line psychotic functioning at a low intellectual level as a 
result of her emotional illness. As or. Wilson, the exarninir.~ 
psychologist stated: 
It was difficult to clarify with Mrs. 
Thomason how much she understands the nature 
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of reported adjustment problems that some of 
her children have. She tends not to be very 
psychologically minded and certainly is lack-
ing in insight. (Record, 224-25.) 
. . She is probably poorly equipped to 
be a strong, appropriately controlling mother 
of adolescent children and it would be very 
difficult for her to cope with emotional 
problems in younger aged children. 
When Mrs. Thomason was approached by the 
examiner about the possible wiseness of de-
fering attempts to have all of her children 
returned to her at the same tirnbe because of 
the possibility that she would have difficul-
ty coping with that much stress, she tended 
to be rather oblivious to the realities of 
the situation. She tends to blandly deny 
that she will have any problem handling her 
children or that they will present any degree 
of stress for her in the mothering role, 
..• The examiner judges that if her child-
ren have any even ordinary, no less extra 
need for control and limited setting, this 
woman is probably doubtfully capable of pro-
viding for those needs. (Record, 227.) 
She seems to be a person who will sin-
cerely attempt to do. her best to cope with 
whatever difficulties arise, but a person who 
has grave limitations in coping skills. 
(Record, 228.) 
After examining Mr. Thomason, the step-father of the 
:hildren, Dr. Wilson stated: 
L 
In my professional opinion serious ques-
tion has to be raised whether this man can 
cope with the stress of the frustration which 
adolesence and emotionally troubled children 
present to parents. In view of his wife's 
serious level emotional difficulties, it is 
certainly questionable whether he can contend 
with the stresses of raising children without 
needing to resort to heavy alcohol usage 
which could only serve to impair his capacity 
to cope. (Record, 234-35.) 
-13-
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Thus, neither the appellant or her husband are emotionally ar_, 
to cope with the problems of raising Evan and Bart. 
In sum, the record is clear that there is conduct ~: 
the part of the appellant which has created an emotional sit~:· 
which is seriously detrimental to her children and because of 
her emotional condition, they cannot be returned to her. Eva:. 
and Bart require the stability that can only come from a ter-
mination of her parental rights and their permanent placement• 
a home where they can establish emotional bonds and sink roots. 
This is particularly true of Evan, who has a desparate need::: 
stability as soon as possible. The Trial Court correctly anah 
this situation in his memorandum decision. (Record, 210-217.) 
He entered Findings of Fact (Record, 218-20) which are fully 
supported in the record and which justify the determination t':· 
there was both conduct on the part of the appellant and condit: 
in both the appellant, State v. Dade, supra, and the children, 
which is seriously detrimental to the children and which requ1: 
the permanent termination of all parental rights of the appelL 
in Evan and Bart. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT ABANDONED HER CHILDREN. 
At the time the trial in this case was concluding, ~­
decision of this Court in State in the Interest of sununersES 
ren v. Wulffenstein, 560 P.2d 331 (Utah, 1977) was published. 
The principles enunciated in that case were applied by the Tr•• 
Court in determining that the appellant abandoned Evan and Ba:· 
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The Trial Court followed the direction to be objective 
3~ take into account: 
. not only the verbal expressions of the 
natural parents, but their conduct as parents 
as well. 560 P. 2d at 334. 
;~.e Trial court, using this objective test, applied it to the 
ruling of this Court that: 
A better definition of abandonment, for these 
purposes, is that abandonment consists of 
conduct on the part of the parent which im-
plies a conscious disregard of the obliga-
tions owed by a parent to the child, leading 
to the destruction of the parent-child rela-
tionship. 560 P.2d at 334. 
The children were voluntarily placed in custody by the 
appellant in February of 1974, visited with Evan and Bart only in 
~arch and May of 1974, wrote to Evan and Bart only once there-
after, in September of 1974. The Court found that while in the 
exchange of letters and oral statements the appellant always said 
that she wanted to maintain contact with and secure the return of 
Evan and Bart, no conduct was undertaken by her to carry through 
.. that expressed desire. While appellant did have her home evalu-
ated by the Division of Family Services in Colorado, she did not 
1 
articulate to the caseworkers in Utah a clear intention to take 
"er children back. In fact, while she was indicating to them 
:hat the marriage was working and that Mr. Thomason was not 
; drinking, she was informing Josalyn, her older daughter, that the 
~arriage might very well break up and that Mr. Thomason was 
'.rinking. This was confirmed by Josalyn during visits with the 
1:· ''Pellant. 
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While appellant was failing to communicate with Ev·· 
Q., 
and Bart, she was also carefully maintaining her ties with :1e: 
older three children. While no support was offered for Evan,-
Bart. No birthday cards, Christmas presents or other forms:: 
communication were sent to Evan or Bart, appellant did sends:: 
cards and presents to and maintain contact with her other ch:::-
ren. 
The Trial Court appropriately determined from this 
conduct that appellant had evidenced a conscious disregard fw 
her parental obligations. 
The testimony of the psychologists who examined Eva:: 
and Bart was equally clear that there has been a total destruc· 
tion of the parent-child relationship in the younger child, Ba:·. 
while only a bitter residue remains in Evan; a residue whict 
serves only the purpose of preventing the establishment of tw 
and bonding with his foster mother. Both of the testing psyd:. 
gists stated their belief that it was conduct on the part of:· 
appellant which has led to the ambiguity of feelings as to wo:; 
that is evidenced in Bart, and it is only by the establishment 
a permanent home where he can emotionally bond with a mother 
figure that will enable him to minimize or undo the damage do~; 
by the appellant. 
The Trial Court correctly determined that each of t::o 
two factors involved in the test of desertion under Section fr 
3a-48, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, had been met. That determ::'· 
tion is appropriate and proper. 
-16-
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The statements of intention to take the minor children 
of the parties by the appellant were made only in response to 
direct inquiries by agents or employees of the Division of Family 
services. None were made by her on her own. Her acts speak for 
themselves and they negate her words. Her words in fact evoked 
the reprimand from the Social Services worker not to make promises 
she would not keep. She did not heed this advice and now, under 
ilie provisions of §78-3a-48, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as inter-
preted by this Court, the significance of her acts has become 
l 
clear. While the record reveals an ongoing contact with her 
older three children, tt is devoid of any such effort to maintain 
contact with Evan and Bart. The test of abandonment enunciated 
by this Court in State of Utah in the Interest of Summers Children 
v. Orin John Wulffenstein, 560 P.2d 331 (1977) has clearly been 
!Uet. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court correctly determined that there was 
conduct on the part of the appellant which has created a condition 
seriously detrimental to her children. It also determined that 
appellant's emotional condition is such that when placed in 
contrast with the emotional needs of her children, continued 
legal ties would be seriously detrimental to them. The Court 
also determined that the appellant had abandoned her children. 
Sach of these determinations is fully supported by the evidence 
1~the record and demonstrates the correctness of the determina-
-17-
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tion to terminate all parental interest of the appellant in :·.-
of her children, Evan and Bart. This Court should affirm tha: 
decision by the Trial Court. 
1977. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3Q_ day of ~ 
~AV~ 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Evan and Bart 
Orgill 
79 South State Street 
P. o. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: 532-1234 
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in case No. 15140, postage prepaid, this ~day of ~ ~ 
19 77 1 to Robert B. Hansen, Attorney General, and Franklyn B. 
~atheson, Assistant Attorney General, at 236 State Capitol 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114; to Olof Johansson, Deputy 
county Attorney, at 3522 South 700 West, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
84119; to David E. Littlefield, Guardian Ad Litem for Evan and 
Bart Orgill, at 707 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111; 
and to Don Blackham, Attorney for Appellant, at 3535 South 3200 
West, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84119. 
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
-19-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
